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THE LITTLE AGENCY THAT COULD 
Sallyanne Payton* 
REGULATORY JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING A WAGE-PRICE FREEZE. By 
Robert A. Kagan. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1978. Pp. 
xi, 200. $10. 
The first observation that must be made about this modest 
and insightful book is that its title verges on deceptive labeling.1 
Regulatory Justice is not a comprehensive treatment of the prob-
lems of legality in the administrative process; it is not even an 
exhaustive analysis of the problems of fair enforcement of the 
wage-price freeze of 1971. It is, rather, a carefully rendered ac-
count of the process of rule formulation and interpretation as 
viewed from the vantage point of the General Counsel's Office of 
the Office of Emergency Preparedness, in which Kagan served as 
an attorney during the freeze. Robert Kagan is both a lawyer and 
a social scientist;2 his research method was that of the 
participant-observer. He has thus given us a fine insider's view 
of the rule-making process, one perhaps unsurpassed in the litera-
ture. The book is rich in conceptual understanding and well-
chosen example. The fact is, however, that the freeze was in effect 
so briefly that most of the truly interesting problems of regulatory 
administration did not have time to mature within the freeze 
agencies. Regulatory Justice gives us a simple story, a purified 
example of basic regulatory process, that can help us greatly in 
understanding the more complex phenomena with which we must 
customarily deal. 
The purpose of the freeze was straightforward. In the judg-
ment of the national political leadership, inflation was out of 
hand in 1971 and threatening to get worse. The previous year, 
Congress had passed the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan, B.A. 1964, LL.B. 1968, Stan-
ford University. 
1. The practice of giving expansive titles to modest monographs can produce some 
striking incongruities. I have on my shelf a work whose dust jacket edge proclaims grandly 
its subject, "Jurisprudence and Statecraft." On closer examination, it turns out to be an 
account of the brief passage of the Wisconsin Development Authority. S. MERMIN, JURIS-
PRUDENCE AND STATECRAFr: THE WISCONSIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND !TS IMPLICATIONS 
(1963). 
2. The dust jacket announces that Kagan holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Yale. He 
is presently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berke-
ley. 
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granting to President Nixon startlingly broad powers "to issue 
such orders and regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabi-
lize prices, rents, wages, and salaries . . . . "3 The President was 
not anxious to use this authority; his vigorously expressed dis-
taste for wage and price controls arose out of both his conservative 
political philosophy and his personal experience as a lawyer for 
the Office of Price Administration during World War II. He re-
sisted the imposition of economy-wide controls until it became 
apparent that even the business community favored them.~ 
When the President finally acted, however, he issued a dra-
matic order. On prime-time television, the evening of August 16, 
1971, the President announced: "I am today ordering a freeze on 
all prices and wages throughout the United States . . . . " He 
promised government enforcement without "a huge price control 
bureaucracy. "5 
The President had ordered the inflationary spiral to stop 
dead in its tracks.6 But secrecy in developing the President's ac-
tion had made it impossible to plan the actual implementation 
of the program: administration thus had to be improvised. No 
large new agency could be created, and primary authority could 
not be given to an existing agency with speciai interest consti-
tuencies. The President himself needed to be insulated from 
individual decisions, but the agency administering the freeze 
had to be clearly identified with the President. 
Out of these imperatives emerged the Cost of Living Council 
3. Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, §202, 84 Stat. 799. President Nixon used 
the Act once before the freeze, to create the Construction Industry Stabilization Commit-
tee (CISC), part of an effort to slow down wage and price increases in the construction 
industry. When Congress extended the Act in May 1971, it also provided that the Presi-
dent could not single out a "particular industry or segment of the economy" unless he 
determined that prices or wages in that industry or segment had risen at a rate that was 
"grossly disproportionate" to rises in the economy generally. Act of May 18, 1971, Pub. 
L. 92-15, §3, 85 Stat. 38. The official history of the freeze is N. YOSHPE, J. ALLUMS, J. 
RUSSELL & B. ATKIN, STEMMING INFLATION: THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND 
THE 90-DAY FREEZE (1972) [hereinafter cited as YosHPE.] 
4. For an account of the political and economic background of the freeze, see A. 
WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABILITY: THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE OF 1971, at 1-9 (1973). 
5. Nixon, The Challenge of Peace, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES, Doc. 1168, 1170 (Aug. 
23, 1971) (text of the President's radio and television address of Aug. 15, 1971). 
6. The symbolic impact of the word "freeze" was stunning. It easily drew on the 
familiar physical experience with things frozen, motionless, stiff. But it also implied 
sudden stopping-as in equally familiar movie images of gunmen oursting into bars or 
banks and shouting "Alright, everybody freeze!" The metaphor itself created public ex-
pectations of how the stabilization policy would be administered. (It is interesting to 
speculate on what greater administrative flexibility is implied by the word "stabilization" 
than by the word "freeze.") 
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(CLC), composed of Cabinet-level officials, whose Executive 
Director was also designated Special Assistant to the President. 7 
For operating responsibilities the CLC turned to the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness (OEP), which was already housed in 
the Executive Office of the President. The OEP was primarily 
responsible for civil defense planning but also dealt with natural 
disasters. It was thus blessed with a short-term crisis orientation, 
a neutral political image, good contacts with state and local gov-
ernments and major industries, and a nationwide communica-
tions system. It was thinly staffed, however, and thus had to 
borrow most of its freeze personnel from other agencies. In the 
field, its own slender resources were augmented by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) field offices and, for rural areas, the Agri-
cultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. For its head-
quarters operation as well, it borrowed widely throughout the 
government. 
For three months, this odd collection of commandeered regu-
lators fulfilled the President's promise: they enforced a freeze. 
They held the line against the appeals and temptations of indivi-
dualized justice, allocative efficiency, pressure group politics, 
natural sympathy, and a sense of proportion. General Motors, the 
unions, antique dealers, and the Girl Scouts8 were all frozen to-
gether. At the end of November 1971, when the regulators went 
back to their other lives, the rise in the consumer price index had 
been trimmed to an annualized rate of 1.6%, the index of average 
hourly earnings for employees in manufacturing had risen at an 
annual rate of only 0.6%, and the wholesale price index was ac-
tually declining at an annual rate of almost 0.4%. 
Why did the freeze turn out so well,9 when the history of 
7. The members of the CLC were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(0MB), the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Special Assistant to 
the President for Consumer Affairs, the Secretaries of Agriculture, L~bor, Commerce, and 
Housing and Urban Development. The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System was designated special Adviser to the Council. The Executive Director of 
the CLC was Arnold R. Weber, a University of Chicago economist who had been serving 
as an Associate Director of the 0MB. Weber has written a fine memoir of the freeze. See 
A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 20-27. The Director of the OEP was General George A. Lincoln, 
a retired Army general who had taught economics at West Point for 22 years and had spent 
his career in security and strategic planning. See id. at 99-105; YosHPE, supra note 3, at 
21-22. 
8. Kagan's account of the Girl Scout episode alone is worth the price of the book and 
the time to read it. See R. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE 119-21, 152 (1978) (hereinafter cited 
by page numbers only). ,. 
9. Arnold Weber has had some second thoughts about the wisdom of a freeze as 
874 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:871 
regulation is a history of agencies gone soft, regulators being cap-
tured, public attention wandering away from regulatory issues, 
political support falling away from agency zealots? As Kagan tells 
it, the answer is that the freeze, and the freeze agencies, were 
unique. 
First, the people in the freeze agencies had not committed 
themselves to careers as wage-price regulators. The members of 
the Cost of Living Council all had major management responsi-
bilities for ongoing government functions. For the OEP itself, the 
freeze was just another assignment to short-term domestic crisis 
management that had to be carried out simultaneously with its 
principal missions. The OEP's borrowed staff members also had 
primary attachments to their home agencies. Kagan describes 
"this hastily assembled pickup team" as "reasonably well-
educated but not brilliant, neither dedicated nor hostile to the 
idea of wage-price controls, without prior knowledge of the sub-
ject, and without ambition for careers in the presumably tempo-
rary program."10 Other agencies, and other regulators, would 
carry out subsequent phases of the stabilization program after the 
freeze had ended. 
Second, both policy and politics allowed the agencies to treat 
the freeze as a problem of enforcing a stringent rule whose single 
purpose was to halt wage and price increases. 11 Although the ex-
plicit words of the Executive Order were not dramatic, 12 the pub-
lic rhetoric and administration of the freeze were intended to have 
"hard" as the one that was imposed. See A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 126-29. He acknowl-
edges, however, that the performance of OEP and IRS was "something of a bureaucratic 
miracle." Id. at 128. 
10. P. 24. 
11. The CLC's interpretation of the term "transaction" indicates most clearly the 
commitment to stringency. Many increases in prices, wages, and fringe benefits had 
previously been scheduled to go into effect after August 15, 1971. In many cases, contracts 
had been signed and preliminary performance had begun. The CLC held that no 
"transaction" had occurred unless the employee had worked at the higher rate, the goods 
had been delivered by the seller, or the rental unit had been occupied (pp. 52-56). See A. 
WEBER, supra note 4, at 57-58. This interpretation ran counter to contract law principles, 
vernacular understandings of when someone "has" something, and widely held notions of 
justice, at least on the part of persons whose legitimate expectations were defeated. In 
December 1971, as a result of vigorous lobbying by labor unions and teachers' organiza• 
tions, the Congress explicitly permitted most frozen pay increases to go into effect retroac-
tively. See A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 127. 
12. Executive Order No. 11615 provided that prices and wages "shall be stabilized 
. • . at levels not greater than those pertaining to a substantial volume of actual transac-
tions ... during the 30-day period ending August 14, 1971, for like or similar commodities 
or services." The order exempted "raw agricultural products." 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 (Aug, 
17, 1971). 
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"a shock effect on expectations," to buy time while the Adminis-
tration developed a more comprehensive policy. The OEP and the 
CLC decided to preserve as many policy options as possible for 
the subsequent phases of the program, a strategy that required 
that the freeze raise few if any expectations of favored treatment 
for particular groups, interests, or philosophies. For example, 
freeze policy could have allowed generous treatment for low-
income wage-earners13 or special hardship consideration for busi-
nesses that had received cost increases just before the freeze went 
into effect but were prevented by the freeze from passing them 
along to their customers. If the freeze agencies had recognized 
such claims, however, they would have reduced the public's ex-
pectation of a halt to inflation (thereby detracting from th_eir own 
mission) and would have created an expectation that subsequent 
phases of the program would recognize the same claims (thereby 
tying the hands of their successor agencies). The freeze agencies 
therefore had good reason not to accommodate values, even 
widely shared ones, that competed with the dominant goal of 
stringency. Any inequities or distortions in individual cases were 
justified by the overall salutary effect of the freeze and were, in 
any event, temporary.14 
Third, the enforcement of a stringent rule was politically and 
economically feasible. Because the economy was in a slack pe-
riod, no severe hardships or shortages developed. The freeze did 
not become a partisan political issue. Although Kagan does not 
deal with politics, it bears noting that the freeze was a Demo-
cratic policy put into effect by a Republican administration; the 
national political leadership was thus united on the need for the 
freeze, if not always on specific strategies and tactics. For ninety 
days, the country was willing to accept a stringent rule, and the 
agencies were structured so that application of a simple stringent 
rule was a satisfying short-term assignment for the heterogeneous 
staff assembled for the purpose. 
Simple commands may be hard to carry out. The freeze pur-
ported to cover nearly every transaction involving wages or 
prices15 in a complicated economy. There were tens of millions of 
13. Eventually the CLC exempted wage increases that would have brought workers 
up to minimum wage standards of general applicability. See A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 
46, 75-76. 
14. Id. at 36. 
15. The CLC read the term "price" to include voluntacy association dues, the term 
"wages" to include fringe benefits of all kinds, the term "rent" to include college dormi-
tory fees. On the other hand, it refused to assimilate to the terms such items as dividends, 
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such transactions every day, almost all of them between consent-
ing adults. The freeze officials quickly perceived that success 
depended upon voluntary compliance, which would only be 
achieved if citizens could find out, easily and quickly, just what 
was expected of them. Citizens also had to believe that their 
sacrifices were being reciprocated by others in a great universal 
rising to the occasion. The most promising way to administer the 
freeze, therefore, was to announce simple, clear, and specific 
rules, develop a mechanism for answering individual inquiries 
quickly and authoritatively, and adhere to a policy of uniform 
rule application. These formalities were accompanied by bound-
less public exhortation on the part of government officials. It is 
important, particularly for lawyers, to understand that the freeze 
was mainly administered through the dissemination of informa-
tion rather than enforced through official investigation and prose-
cution. The freeze agencies conceived of their task primarily as a 
venture in governance rather than law enforcement. 
The core of Regulatory Justice is a description of how the 
freeze agencies developed a regime of rules during the ninety-day 
period. No law compelled them to do so. The Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act contained no standards to guide presidential discretion, 
except the direction that the policies had to be universal unless 
the President had superior justification for treating industries or 
segments of the economy unequally. The Executive Order par-
ticularized the command only by giving the CLC a date around 
which to freeze wages and prices. Both the Act and the Executive 
Order were silent on whether the Administrative Procedure Act 
applied, 16 and they provided no independent procedural guid-
corporate profits, welfare payments, and local taxes. Executive Order 11615 did not cover 
interest rates, which declined during the freeze, as expected. Kagan suggests that the CLC 
decided that the freeze did not apply to interest rates (p. 50-51). Weber gives a fuller 
explanation, but also says that the CLC itself debated the point. A. WEBER, supra note 4, 
at 38-39. However, Yoshpe quotes a statement by Treasury Secretary Connally on August 
15, 1971, just before the President's freeze announcement, to the effect that the planning 
group had decided to exclude interest rates. YosHPE, supra note 3, at 17-18. 
16. It is not at all clear just how the freeze agencies' activities would be viewed under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A). Most of their actions consisted of informal jaw• 
boning, exhortation, public shaming. See 86 HARV. L. REV.1380, 1403-06 (1973). Executive 
Order 11615 required a good deal of interpretation. After the CLC delegated to the OEP 
the authority to "implement, administer, monitor and enforce" the freeze (CLC Order No, 
1, Aug. 17, 1971), the OEP Director, General Lincoln, issued Economic Stabilization 
Regulation 1, defining most of the key terms. The regulation itself was clearly an 
"interpretative rule" within the meaning of the APA. It was amended five times. For even 
more particularized guidance there were the Economic Stabilization Circulars, which 
crystallized policy decisions that had been made in the context of individual cases. The 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] Little Agency That Could 877 
ance. Neither the CLC nor the OEP promulgated procedural reg-
ulations. The courts largely deferred to the agencies on matters 
of substance, 17 and only one court purported to impose procedural 
requirements: Judge Leventhal, in the course of upholding the 
freeze against objections founded on the nondelegation doctrine, 
held that the judicial review and rule-making provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act applied to freeze activities. 18 Since 
the agencies were by that time proceeding almost entirely by 
informal action and interpretative advice, the imposition of the 
formal core of administrative law upon their activities had little 
tangible effect, though it might have served as a reminder to 
seasoned intuitions that the federal judiciary would not tolerate 
obvious abuses of administrative discretion. 
For all practical purposes, therefore, the freeze agencies were 
law unto themselves with. respect to both substance and proce-
dure. The agencies were in theory free· to devise whatever rules 
they liked, subject to judicial review only for rationality; the pub-
lic had no opportunity to participate iri makingthe rules; individ-
ual citizens who wished to challenge the agencies' interpretations 
of their authority had to run the risk of defending an enforcement 
action in order to be certain of being heard. The situation, so 
described from the standpoint of administrative law, sounds like 
the nightmare of delegation run riot. 19 But no ~isaster ensued. All 
the practical pressures pushed the· agencies tow~d. consistency 
and uniformity, toward a rule-bound legality. The freeze was 
administered by officials who believed th~t the program would be 
viewed by the people as legitimate, and therefore would succeed, 
only if it were based on a set of apparently rational rules that were 
being applied universally, uniformly, and fairly. If there _was a 
danger in these agencies, it was that legality might bleed into its 
excess, legalism, not that uncontrolled discretion might lead to 
courts treated these as interpretative rules. In addition, the .agencies issued hundreds of 
opinion letters. See Gellhorn, The Legal Effect of Anti-Inflation Aduice from Government 
Agencies, PRAc. LAW., Dec. 1971, at 13. 
17. The government filed suit against violators in only eight cases, selected mainly 
for their symbolic value. The government itself was sued in 37 cases. Most of the cases 
had not been decided by the time the freeze ended; of the eight that had, the government 
had won six and lost two. For an account of the freeze agencies' enforcement tactics, see 
A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 84-98; YcisHPE, supra note 3, at 117-42. 
18. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). 
19. Kagan notes that "there was in fact no significant interference by the courts with 
the over four hundred rules and thousands of individual rulings issued by the administra-
tive agencies which were regulating the central economic decisions of millions of corpora-
tions and business firms across the whole nation" (p. 123). 
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enforcement by whim. 
The most important source of reinforcement for the agencies' 
standards of legality was the program's need for public support, 
which could only be gained if the press accorded the freeze both 
extensive news coverage and at least mild editorial approval. The 
price of press coverage is press scrutiny; the national press re-
ported agency rulings throughout the duration of the program 
and was alert to charges of inconsistency or favoritism. Unlike 
most regulatory agencies, therefore, the CLC and the OEP did 
not recede into obscurity during the life of their program. The fact 
of daily exposure to powerful news agencies sharpened the agen-
cies' desire to administer the freeze in a way that would be 
broadly perceived as fair. "Fairness," however, quickly came to 
mean fair rules. Particular cases were viewed as occasions to 
make or apply rules, not as opportunities to do individualized 
justice. The administrative techniques of the agencies reflected 
these objectives: the agencies wished to be able to tell inquirers 
promptly what rule governed their case. The transmission of the 
information was to be individualized; the content of the informa-
tion itself was not. 
The danger of governing through a body of written rules is 
that the officials who interpret them may not be aware of, or may 
ignore, the purposes that individual rules, or the body of rules, 
are designed to serve. The rules· then take on a life of their own 
through the elaboration of the conventional meanings of their 
words, divorced from purpose and direction. This phenomenon is 
generally called "legalism." It seems inevitable that a good deal 
of it must have occurred in the freeze operation: with over 360 IRS 
and OEP field offices receiving in excess of 800,000 inquiries, 
some of the advice given must have been mistaken or unnecessar-
ily rigid. On the other hand, the stringency of the freeze tended 
to encourage legalism: when in doubt, it was best for an official 
answering an inquiry to err on the side of deciding that the price 
or wage increase was frozen, without close inquiry into the eco-
nomic goals undergirding the program. The field forwarded to the 
OEP national office only 1,100 questions that they were unable 
to answer,20 most of which involved requests for exception or ex-
emption.21 The OEP General Counsel functioned as the agencies' 
20. See YoSHPE, supra note 3, at 68-69. 
21. The initial rules themselves excepted raw agricultural products, school tuitions, 
stocks and bonds, and exports. Most of the CLC rulings thereafter elaborated on the 
boundaries of the initial exceptions, mainly in order to confine the reach of economic or 
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court of appeals with respect to difficult questions of rule inter-
pretation. 
Within the OEP General Counsel's office the problem of in-
forming the borrowed staffers of the agency's purpose and the 
problem of maintaining rationality in rule application were both 
solved by a single technique: staff members were encourged to 
consult one another when they were in doubt about the proper 
handling of a question. 22 Colleagues consulted among themselves; 
disagreement or uncertainty on a question resulted in referring it 
to the next superior level, all the way to the OEP General Counsel 
himself, who would try to divine what the CLC itself would do 
with the issue. Where significant doubt remained, the CLC was 
asked to make or clarify policy. This process kept lower-level 
officials informed of the policy norms of the principal officials 
responsible for the freeze and provided collective judgment on 
virtually every issue, thus building an institutional memory of 
case precedent. 
The staff was preoccupied, Kagan tells us, with reaching the 
right result in the cases presented to it, which meant finding the 
rule that the CLC would apply if the CLC were making the deci-
sion. The focus was on purposive rule interpretation, and the only 
legitimate authority with respect to policy was the CLC itself. 
There was no informal support for individual staffers' pursuit of 
their own policy preferences. Nor did the office itself contain 
competing power centers that might have developed institutional 
interests and rivalries, however temporary. 
True fidelity to the CLC's desires, and true consistency 
within the body of rules, required that the staff pay constant 
attention to the policy goals of the freeze. Within the OEP Gen-
eral Counsel's office, at least, Kagan assures us that the rules did 
not take on a life of their own, independent of their policy founda-
tion. In truth, however, the stringent freeze policy as formulated 
by the CLC did not lend itself to much shading, 23 and the pre-
sumption in favor of stringency, coupled with time pressure, inev-
justice objectives that might be inferred logically from the exceptions. The overwhelming 
number of requests for exception (by rule) or exemption (of individuals or firms because 
of individualized hardship) were denied. See pp. 62-64; YosHPE, supra note 3, at 96-116. 
22. The behavior of the OEP General Counsel personnel supports the intuition that 
consultation among colleagues engaged in administering a common set of rules is a natural 
and perhaps irrepressible form of behavior. See P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY 
121-43 (rev. ed. 1963). 
23. See generally pp. 99-110. 
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itably pushed the OEP General Counsel's staff toward legalism.2J 
On the lever of pure description, the story of the freeze agen-
cies may seem unexceptional, routine, a mildly interesting story 
about a short-term government program that worked. The most 
interesting fact for administrative-law scholars to ponder, how-
ever, is that the model of the freeze as a regime of rules was 
developed mainly by nonlawyers, operating within the political-
governmental culture. Most of the CLC members were econo-
mists or businesspeople. The Director of the OEP, General Lin-
coln, was an economist by training; the design of the program 
owed a great deal to ~is developed techniques of crisis manage-
ment. 25 Even within the OEP General Counsel's office not all of 
the professionals were lawyers.28 It further appears that the pros-
pect of judicial review of agency decisions had no significant ef-
fect on freeze policy. In fact, Kagan tells us that "[a]s a day-to-
. day inducement to legal craftsmanship and sensitivity, the close 
attention of the news media was distinctly more important. "27 
Administration of the freeze took the form of a regime of rules 
because a set of stringent rules, consistently applied, fitted the 
program managers' requirements for efficient enforcement.28 
24. See pp. 132-33. 
25. See YosHPE, supra note 3, at 27-29. 
26. The General Counsel's office reached a peak strength of 28 attorneys, 11 
"specialists," and 20 secretaries. YosHPE, supra note 3, at 49. The Special Assistant to the 
General Counsel, who played an important role in the development of freeze policy and 
in decisions on hard cases, was Major John Simpson of the United States Army, a systems 
analyst by training. See p. 100 n. 1. 
27. Pp. 123-25. 
28. It should not surprise us that laypeople can develop and apply rules intelligently. 
The legal culture is so self-absorbed, however, that lawyers occasionally forget that ration• 
ality is part of the professional culture of the senior levels of government. Kagan's own 
terminology unfortunately feeds the myth of the superiority of lawyers. In describing the 
technique of interpreting a body of rules in a way that furthers program goals, he coins a 
new usage, "the judicial mode of rule application." See p. 91. It turns out that this 
technique consists of looking behind the words of a rule to see whether the substantive 
outcome of a particular application of the rule is consistent with the purpose of the rule 
and the overall goals of the program. While judges have been more articulate than other 
professionals in interpreting rules (which is why Kagan dubs the process "the judicial 
mode"), the technique is used widely by rule-applying organizations, at least at the policy-
making levels. To call it "the judicial mode," however, conveys the impression that 
lawyers have, if not a monopoly on the mode, at least a special expertise in it. The usage 
helps perpetuate the myth that lawyers have unique authority in interpreting words in 
statutes and regulations. Of course this myth is helpful to the lawyers' mystique and 
consequent power within a rule-applying organization. The myth (which lawyers seem to 
believe) also helps account for the surprise that lawyers themselves feel when they encoun-
ter laypeople who are skilled in rational thinking about rules. Even Kagan is surprised 
when he discovers that he could see vecy little difference between the lawyers and the non-
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Legality was thus the governing principle; however, the 
freeze agencies did not adhere to other conspicuous values of the 
legal culture, principally those of public participation in the de-
velopment of rules, care in making determinations of fact both in 
disposing of individual cases and in formulating policy, and giv-
ing statements of reasons for official action. 
The lack of public participation in rule formulation is easy 
to understand: .the urgency of developing and implementing rules 
for a ninety-day program could reasonably be thought to preclude 
notice and comment. Likewise, the task of issuing explanations 
for rules could reasonably be thought to produce more expendi-
ture of resources than was justified in view of the simple nature 
and brief duration of the program. . 
The agencies' casualness about factual-accuracy, however, is 
slightly more troubling. Individualized wage and price advice af-
fected not only the inquirer but also other parties to transactions 
involving the wage or price at issue. Yet the process worked al-
most entirely ex parte. Inquiries and complaints came to the 
agencies in the form of telephone calls, letters, and personal visits 
from inquirers or their representatives. 29 Where the inquiry was a 
request for advice, the agencies acted on the basis of facts submit-
ted by the inquirer. Sometimes the inquiry would be accompa-
nied by a factual presentation and argument of considerable com-
plexity, sometimes not. Sometimes the inquiry would come 
through a congressional office or administration official; occa-
sionally the inquirer would manage to arrange a personal visit to 
a freeze official. 30 However the inquiry arrived, it was decided on 
lawyers he observed in their approach to rule interpretation (pp. 99-100). An earlier study 
of lawyers and nonlawyers working together in a rule-making group had similarly con-
cluded that their approaches were not significantly different, at least once the lawyers 
stopped trying to monopolize the process of rule-interpretation. See V. THOMPSON, THE 
REGULATORY PROCESS IN OPA RATIONING 102-04 (1950). 
29. There were thousands of investigations. fu 62% of them the IRS found no viola-
tion. In most of the rest, the seller or landlord agreed to roll back the price increase. Only 
214 cases were forwarded to the OEP for review; only eight lawsuits were filed, principally 
because of the expense of time and resources involved in litigating cases de nova in federal 
district court. fu addition, the IRS did not have subpoena power. Both Justice Depart-
ment and CLC lawyers were nervous about the ability of the freeze program to withstand 
challenges on constitutional- and administrative-law grounds, a fear that later proved 
excessive. The result of these impediments was that "the threat of legal sanctions was the 
preferred technique rather than the actual initiation of court proceedings [and] emphasis 
was placed on the manipulation of such threats of legal action .••. "A.WEBER, supra 
note 4, at 95; see id. at 84-98 for an account of the legal enforcement effort. 
30. Kagan tells us that interests that were well-organized or well-represented did not 
obtain accommodative rulings more often than those that were not, even though the well-
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the basis of the unverified facts set out in the inquirer's submis-
sion, with no participation by parties who might disagree with 
those factual assertions or be affected by the agency's ruling. On 
the rare occasion when facts presented by an inquirer were chal-
lenged by an interested party, the OEP was unequipped and 
unwilling to resolve the factual dispute.31 
This unwillingness to deal with problems of factual accuracy, 
however troubling it may be to lawyers, is understandable if 
viewed from the perspective of the program-managers.32 Individ-
ualized fact determination is associated with selective govern-
ment action; the freeze agencies, by contrast, were primarily in-
terested in gross results. Making certain that individuals were not 
distorting facts in their requests for advice was less important 
than developing general rules, knowledge of which could be dis-
seminated throughout the system and affect the actions of many 
other parties. 
The standards of official behavior that actually controlled 
the administration of the freeze arose unmistakably out of the 
political-governmental culture rather than the legal culture. Yet, 
in general, it is clear that the program-managers' need for effi-
cient administration, the public's vernacular understanding of 
the concept of "fairness," and the legal culture's ideal of rational-
ity all pushed in the same direction. In agencies with more com-
plex missions and longer time horizons, they nearly always pull 
apart. Indeed, they had begun to pull apart as the stabilization 
program entered its second phase, which is beyond the scope of 
Kagan's book. 
The freeze experience is a meteor in the history of the admin-
istrative process, but its light throws into relief our previous un-
derstanding of administrative agencies with more complex pro-
organized or well-represented could command the attention of higher-level officials. Their 
superior advocacy and access were more than offset by the visibility of any concession that 
might be made to them (pp. 157-61). 
31. See pp. 128-32. 
32. If the program had been of longer duration, it probably would have been forced 
to develop more procedural regularity. The lawyers would have encouraged the program 
managers to allow public comment on the rules and to be more careful in accepting the 
truth of facts conveyed ex parte. Compare pp. 123-25. Weber's final judgment was that 
the system worked because the task generated a sense of importance and dedication 
that is rare in large bureaucracies. Essentially, the administrative system did the 
job because it was not ensnared in procedures that often constrain normal govern-
mental activities. The structure that was designed would have proven too cumber-
some and diffuse to operate effectively over a long period. 
A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 35. 
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gram missions and more permanent institutional interests. This 
simple tale about a simple program reminds us that regulatory 
purpose and structure are at least as important as law in influenc-
ing the degree to which an agency will be inclined toward legality 
in its decision-making. 
Kagari has written a good book. Regulatory Justice should go 
onto the short list of essential works on the administrative pro-
cess. What it lacks in complexity of subject matter it more than 
makes up in theoretical insight and bibliographical reference. 
Kagan is scrupulous in locating the freeze experience against the 
background of existing jurisprudential and social learning. on the 
administrative process. The book is a concise and thoughtful 
guide to the literature. It is honest and careful, a model of its 
genre. It should not, however, be taken for what it is not. It is not 
a history of the freeze; nor is it an explanation of the total process 
of freeze policy formulation and enforcement. The General Coun-
sel's office of the OEP was only a small part of the operation, and 
Kagan barely hints at the rest of the activities of the freeze agen-
cies. What he gives us, however, is of exceptionally high quality. 
We can hope that he will continue to do work of this kind. It is 
badly needed. 
